At dawn we slept — we’d like to anyway, if the Iranians would just shut up
We spent a little time looking in on our copy of Gordon Prange’s 900 page behemoth on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, At Dawn We Slept, to see what thoughts it might inspire regarding our current situation with Iran. There are certain ironies, of course. For example, the US was using its oil weapon against Japan in 1941, bearing some resemblance to Iran today. Prior to World War II, Japan depended on US exports of oil, and FDR’s 1940 oil embargo put pressure on that country. In today’s world, nary a day goes by without Iran making some threat or other to cut off oil supplies to the West. Plus ça change…
We are struck by a couple of differences between that time long ago and our situation today. In 1941, there were active negotiations between Japan and the United States almost right up to the eve of Pearl Harbor. The Hull Note of November 26, 1941 has been characterized as an ultimatum by the US to Japan, but it looks more like some actual form of diplomacy than the UN’s feckless internal squabbling and Iran’s non-stop bluster.
The difference between then and now that strikes us hardest, however, is this: Japan had a mighty military in 1941 and Iran has next-to-nothing in terms of serious military capability, compared to the US. Meanwhile, despite Iran’s military budget of less than 1% of that of America, Iranian officials continue to make bizarre threats (via Iran Focus): “With the scientific knowledge obtained about the enemies’ weak points, no country would dare or has the capability to attack Iran”, Chief of the army’s Ground Forces, Brigadier General Mohammad-Hossein Dadress, said. Bluster, insanity, or something else?
In addition to differences, there are some possible parallels between 1941 and now. In 1941, the United States did not want to be the party that initiated large-scale hostilities. After the failure of the Hull Note discussions on November 27, 1941, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall sent this message to field commanders (At Dawn, p. 402):
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
We’d bet dollars to doughnuts that George Bush would very much like to see some “first overt act” from Iran, and does not want to initiate hostilities. To tell you the truth, if we had his job, we’d be sorely tempted to engineer some “first overt act” on Iran’s part, and rid the world of a clear and present danger.
UPDATE
Speaking of sleeping, consider the answers of an Iranian-born, Muslim-born opposition leader to questions posed by Jerusalem Post editor David Horovitz:
– Q:How worried should the West be by the nuclear drive and horrible rhetoric?
– A: Extremely worried. They should not be sleeping at night. If they are sleeping at night they are fools. They should take Ahmadinejad at face value. This is no rhetoric for political consumption, or domestic consumption, or international consumption. He means what he says and says what he means. And when I say “he” I mean “they” - the regime.
– Q: If they had a nuclear capability would they use it?
– A:I would say so, yes.
Iran is a paper tiger now, but will be something else entirely with nuclear weapons. Time to call their bluff. We yearn for the day they try to close the strait of Hormuz (Austin Bay), a matter we have also discussed, and fear only a “measured” response by the US. Once this window of opportunity closes, it will be closed forever. (HT: Powerline)
May 7th, 2006 at 2:17 pm
“President Bush told us to come out, so did Reza Pahlavi, so did all the opposition leaders. We came to the streets and nothing happened. Our friends were beaten up. A lot of our friends are in jail. We kept our end of the bargain; nobody else kept theirs.”
That is the money quote. We hear the same predictions about allies from within in every one of these crises, yet they never emerge. Even tha German and Japanese occupations didn’t produce uprisings. (Until the occupied could hear the allied tanks, that is.)
We can’t make revolutions, only the oppressed can. We must act on our own, as though we had no allies within. If they appear, great, but we cannot depend upon them.
Our strength is pure coercion- killing people and breaking things. We should use that. To quote Bill Whittle, your enemy may or may not want a carrot, but no one likes a poke in the eye with a stick.