We haven’t spent much time on the ISG report, other than a quick read-through. Its analysis and overview section has some good points, but as a document for an executive or decision-maker, it appears to be worthless, according to some rules of thumb from the management world.

If as an executive you get a report from a committee that has 79 recommendations, your first move should be to fire everyone on the committee. 79 recommendations is pretty much the same as zero recommendations. Any plan that is meant to be taken seriously as a plan should have very few recommendations. In other words, if you have 79 priorities, you have no priorities at all.

Recommendation #1 of the ISG report is to hold a gabfest, and to consult Recommendation #2 for a ten-point agenda for said gabfest. We join Mark Steyn, already in progress, for details on the invitees to said gabfest:

“RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria . . .”

Er, OK. I suppose that’s what you famously hardheaded “realists” mean by realism. But wait, we’re not done yet. For this “Support Group,” we need the extra-large function room. Aside from Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait, the ISG — the Iraq Surrender Gran’pas — want also to invite:

“. . . the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States . . .”

Er, OK. So it’s basically an Arab League meeting. Not a “Support Group” I’d want to look for support from, but each to his own. But wait, Secretary Baker’s still warming up:

“. . . the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council . . .”

That would be America, Britain, France, Russia, China. A diverse quintet, representing many distinctive approaches to international affairs from stylish hauteur to polonium-210. Anybody else?

“. . . the European Union . . .”

Hey, why not? It’s not really multilateral unless there’s a Belgian on board, right? Oh, and let’s not forget:

“. . . the Support Group should call on the participation of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as his representative . . .”…

So there you have it: an Iraq “Support Group” that brings together the Arab League, the European Union, Iran, Russia, China and the U.N. And with support like that who needs lack of support? It worked in Darfur…lest you think there are no minimum admission criteria to James Baker’s “Support Group,” relax, it’s a very restricted membership: Arabs, Persians, Chinese commies, French obstructionists, Russian assassination squads. But no Jews. Even though Israel is the only country to be required to make specific concessions — return the Golan Heights, etc….

And, incidentally, how did that phrase — “the right of return” — get so carelessly inserted into a document signed by two former secretaries of state, two former senators, a former attorney general, Supreme Court judge, defense secretary, congressman, etc. These are by far the most prominent Americans ever to legitimize a concept whose very purpose is to render any Zionist entity impossible. I’m not one of those who assumes that just because much of James Baker’s post-government career has been so lavishly endowed by the Saudis that he must necessarily be a wholly owned subsidiary of King Abdullah, but it’s striking how this document frames all the issues within the pathologies of the enemy.

On second thought, there is a way that 79 Recommendations can be read as a single recommendation, and Mark Steyn has pointed the way to that interpretation. That interpretation is a message to the Arab League (with the Israel business added for spice and as an inducement to them to come to the table). The message is: “We broke it. You own it. Better come to the table and chat amongst yourselves about Iraq, cause we’re outa here.”

Maybe that really was Recommendation #1, but was left out of the version of the ISG Report that was printed up for public consumption.

UPDATE

We also thought that James Lewis’s analysis of the situation had a lot going for it, that the report was, among other things, a means of giving cover to those whose ideologies or previous political positions had made bi-partisanship impossible; these politicians needed a means of getting out of that jam.

This entry was posted on Sunday, December 10th, 2006 at 9:40 am and is filed under Democrats, General, Iran, Religion, Republicans, War. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.