One media war in Iraq
It is reported that “anti-Shi’ite hate speech is an increasingly prominent part” of a Sunni insurgent media war in Iraq, according to a 74 page study by Radio Free Europe analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo. Here is an excerpt from this study of the most sophisticated and brutal internet TV on the planet, which regularly features executions and atrocities in graphic detail:
Those who choose to continue to deny the specifically religious fount from which the conflict springs should consider this further passage:
The vast majority of the statements issued in March 2007 use religion-based, pejorative codewords for the targets of attacks. U.S. and coalition forces are called “crusaders” and “worshipers of the cross.” Iraqi police are “apostates.” Iraq’s National Guard is the “Idolatrous Guard.” The Shi’ite Imam Al-Mahdi Army — named after the Mahdi, or redeemer,whose coming is supposed to herald the end of the world — is referred to as the “Army of the Antichrist.” Shi’a are termed “rejectionists” for their supposed rejection of true Islam. Thus, insurgents’ rhetoric implies that they fight U.S. and coalition forces because they seek to impose Christianity on Iraq, government forces because they have turned their backs on Islam, and Shi’a because they are heretics.
Wretchard has an excerpt from the summary of the report, which notes, among other things, that the “popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand.”
We referred below to the greater Sunni — Shiite confrontation that may be part of the broader context of apparently recent policy decisions regarding diplomacy about Iraq and the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians. Perhaps we understated the emotions involved, at least if the media war in Iraq is indicative of them.
July 19th, 2007 at 5:14 pm
The way I see Iraq is as follows. Zarqawi of AQI declares war on Iraqi Shiites in an effort to incite a civil war. The tactic used by AQI is suicide bombs, mostly vehicle driven, to kill the maximum number of Shiites and/or damage or destroy Shiite symbols. In Februrary 2004, AQI succeeded in its most consequential attack, the destruction of the Al Askari Mosque in Samarra. A glance at civilian death tolls show that at that point the Shiite militia responded, largely by capturing, torturing and killing young Sunni males. This pattern has largely held since 2004, with so-called Sunni Iraqi insurgents (Ansar al Sunnah and others) either co-opted by AQI (the Islamists) or retiring from the field (the Baath party remnants). Has AQI succeeded in inciting a real civil war, defined by scholar as conflict meeting the following two criteria: the warring groups must be from the same country and fighting for control of the political center, control over a separatist state or to force a major change in policy? Their second criterion is that at least 1,000 people must have been killed in total, with at least 100 from each side. Since only the second criteria, scale of deaths, is met in Iraq, we do not have a civil war. Therefore, the strategy, if we are to succeed there, must be to crush AQI and stop the flow into Iraq of suicide bombers and “soldiers.” At the same time the Shiite dominated government must use its influence to control the Shiite militia and stop the anti young Sunni male killings. Once the population is given adequate security and a (relatively) stable environment in which to live, the competing political forces (tribal, ethnic and religious) must make progress in resolving their differences and establishing a workable constitutional and legal framework for long term stability. Stopping AQI is the key and logical focus of attention. The use of the term civil war for Iraq is a distraction from the real situation and may result in the misuse of our diplomatic and military resources, as well as provide the Dems with a convenient sound bite to push for surrender in Iraq. I don’t deny the religious “fount” of the conflict, but I do not believe that that paradigm, by itself, constitutes a useful guide to policy in Iraq.