Framing a political choice
Anthony Cordesman has been for some time a particularly sharp critic of President Bush on Iraq and democratization. (Here are some examples from two years ago: “we need to be much more honest with what we’re doing…What we should have been able to avoid are the mistakes we continued to make in 2004 and 2005…We keep talking about democracy. Well I think Athens, in its history as a pure democracy, had about thirty good years and about two hundred really bad ones.”) Cordesman is considerably more upbeat today, but warns that the process towards America’s ultimate goal will not be easy or quick. Cordesman’s WaPo piece is entitled “Two winnable wars”:
The military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are very different. The United States and its allies are winning virtually every tactical clash in both countries. In Iraq, however, al-Qaeda is clearly losing in every province. It is being reduced to a losing struggle for control of Nineveh and Mosul. There is a very real prospect of coalition forces bringing a reasonable degree of security …
What the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have in common is that it will take a major and consistent U.S. effort throughout the next administration at least to win either war. Any American political debate that ignores or denies the fact that these are long wars is dishonest and will ensure defeat. There are good reasons that the briefing slides in U.S. military and aid presentations for both battlefields don’t end in 2008 or with some aid compact that expires in 2009. They go well beyond 2012 and often to 2020.
If the next president, Congress and the American people cannot face this reality, we will lose. Years of false promises about the speed with which we can create effective army, police and criminal justice capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot disguise the fact that mature, effective local forces and structures will not be available until 2012 and probably well beyond. This does not mean that U.S. and allied force levels cannot be cut over time, but a serious military and advisory presence will probably be needed for at least that long, and rushed reductions in forces or providing inadequate forces will lead to a collapse at the military level.
The most serious problems, however, are governance and development. Both countries face critical internal divisions and levels of poverty and unemployment that will require patience. These troubles can be worked out, but only over a period of years. Both central governments are corrupt and ineffective, and they cannot bring development and services without years of additional aid at far higher levels than the Bush administration now budgets. Blaming weak governments or trying to rush them into effective action by threatening to leave will undercut them long before they are strong enough to act.
Any American political leader who cannot face these realities, now or in the future, will ensure defeat in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Any Congress that insists on instant victory or success will do the same. We either need long-term commitments, effective long-term resources and strategic patience — or we do not need enemies. We will defeat ourselves.
Cordesman, a professor now and former aide to Senator McCain, would appear to be describing the difference between victory and defeat as a domestic political choice. Is that actually true?
Some knowledgeable observers think that Senator Obama’s policy regarding Iraq, should he become President, would be little different from that of a President McCain. Maybe that’s true, but it is hard to entirely credit that view, given the centrality of the anti-war stance to the Obama campaign, as well as the Senator’s clear statement that he will have all the combat troops out of Iraq in 16 months. We understand that reality often trumps campaign promises, but the Cordesman piece establishes one very bright line in the general election campaign that is now nearly underway.
February 24th, 2008 at 4:20 pm
Obviously Cordesman is aware of the comparison with Vietnam. Perhaps he keeps it unsaid because of the readership he is trying to persuade.
My bad feeling is that Bush’s strategy for the war’s critical nonmilitary dimensions differs little from Obamaesque wishful thinking.
I’m not entirely comfortable with Cordesman’s reference to ‘wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan: IMO these countries are better be described as theaters of an encompassing war. In fact, because of the nonmilitary dimensions, the term ‘war’ might be inadequate, but a better one does not come to mind.