What was the mistake?
What was the screw up that led to calamitous move by Georgia against South Ossetia? Was it a failure of US intelligence, or US imagination? (Or rogue behavior on the part of Georgia?) George Friedman of Stratfor speculates:
It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it.
This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions.
The United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion. If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region.
Which would be more troubling, that the US failed to imagine and credit a potential Russian response, or that it failed to notice properly the substantial logistical and operations planning that went into the Russian counterattack?
August 13th, 2008 at 3:45 am
Friedman writes:
I accept that conclusion, but, even after recalling the National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iran, I’m not convinced that Friedman’s two possibilities are the only ones.
Saalkashvili might have gone rogue, betting that the Russians would fold or the US would have to back him. A Georgian and/or Russian commander might have gone rogue. The Russians might have penetrated the Georgian command structure or our intelligence agencies (the Soviets had good success back in the day).
Pure speculation: If Saalkashvili is culpable, the Russians might not want him removed at this time. They might prefer to keep him in place, warn us that next time there won’t be a ceasefire, and let the loose cannon be our, and the Georgian public’s, problem.
August 13th, 2008 at 11:26 am
Or… that the information was known and clearly understood but Putin’s and desire will was not. Only one way to find out…push the button.
August 13th, 2008 at 3:43 pm
I beleive the question rests on concept that this was in effect an internal issue for Georgia. If Saalkashvili stressed that moving Georgian forces in Georgian territory was an internal matter, how would you argue against that? In the end, if the US did not step aside and allow Georgia to deal with an internal matter, it was signalling that the breakaway provinces were not part of Georgia.
As the move was made on the eve of the Olympics it was assured that the effect of the obvious conflict would be mitigated in the media by the Olympic coverage. I beleive everyone knew with high probability what the result of the exercise would be.
Is the US expected to micro-manage all ethnic disputes in the world? I know that all ethnic groups are represented in the citizenry of the United States of America, but to shoulder everyone’s battles as “the big stick” may be asking too much. Possibly after this exercise, the US will be able to “speak softly” and still be heard in certain nations of the world.