Overview
We have written a lot about the apparent red shift of the last decade, the trend toward the Republican party at many levels of government. Today’s question is: if you were running the DNC, where would you try to find the votes you need to win. It’s a hard task, given the location of your voters, the growth trends of Republican areas, and the structural problems of the Democratic party. Here are some of the issues in play.
The 3 – 4 million Democrats who turned to the dark side
John Podhoretz put the figure at 3.6 million; Roger Simon says 3 million, and adds this:
The Democrats lost in the last election much more seriously than is commonly understood. A swing of three million votes is gigantic in our society where party allegiances are formed in childhood and reinforced by an omnipresent media. We can see the primitiveness of these allegiances in the remaining popularity of Howard Dean, a man who a very few years ago presented himself as a pro-gun centrist, jumping around like a re-upped version of Jerry Rubin to appeal to a segment of the Democratic Party that hasn’t changed one view about anything in thirty-five years. But… and here’s the crux… these people are not that exceptional. Few of us change our views over a lifetime.
Yet, three million did.
He has it exactly right. These Democrats didn’t stay home; they didn’t leave the presidential ballot unmarked. They crossed over to the dark side. One supposes they weren’t brought to the polls by anyone’s GOTV effort, though that is hard to know. In any event, they showed up, having voted for Al Gore, and pulled the lever for Bush. And they did so despite Bush being portrayed as an evil moron chimp Hitler. These Democrats rejected the leftward direction of their party; can the Democrats win them back or replace them with other voters?
The staggering 12 million vote difference between 2004 and 2000
62 million people voted for Bush in 2004 versus 50 million in 2000, including these 3 – 4 million Democrat Gore voters. The 2004 election had the highest turnout of any election in US history, and both sides pulled out the stops to make that happen. However, maybe the Democrats can do even more to increase turnout. Let’s take a look to see if that is feasible.
The Democrats’ structural problem of geographic concentration
Let’s look at where the votes are. You are familiar with the county map of the election:
You may not be familiar with the enormous concentration of the blue in a few major urban areas, as depicted by the folks who do the election graphics for CBS:
Now look at this map of Democratic fundraising concentration. The size of the circles indicates the amount of money raised in that area; the percentage of blue in the circle is the amount raised for the Democrat. You will not be surprised to see that the funding concentration is in the heavily Democratic media, government, and education centers — such as LA, NYC, Boston, DC, SF, etc — where a significant portion of the Kerry vote was also concentrated:
It’s as though the party bigwigs and the Democratic money men are standing in high rises in LA, New York and a few other cities, shouting through the Old Media megaphone at voters — and fewer and fewer people are listening. This is due, in important measure, to the rise of the New Media. Indeed, the scandals in the Old Media during the election season were, among other things, evidence of the panic that subconsciously gripped the Old Media titans as they felt their power slipping away.
The Democrats dominate mature or declining population centers
Add to the mix that the Democrats pulled out all the stops with their traditional constituencies, as described in Matt Bai’s excellent NYT Magazine piece about the GOTV effort in Ohio:
Therein, perhaps, lies the real lesson from Ohio, and from the election as a whole. From the days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and especially after the disputed election of 2000, Democrats operated on the premise that they were superior in numbers, if only because their supporters lived in such concentrated urban communities. If they could mobilize every Democratic vote in America’s industrial centers — and in its populist heartland as well — then they would win on math alone. Not anymore. Republicans now have their own concentrated vote, and it will probably continue to swell. Turnout operations like ACT can be remarkably successful at corralling the votes that exist, but turnout alone is no longer enough to win a national election for Democrats. The next Democrat who wins will be the one who changes enough minds.
”I can’t think of a thing in Ohio that we could have done more to boost our vote,” Steve Rosenthal told me three days after the election, as the trauma of the defeat began to subside. ”The shortcoming in some ways is that the national Democratic Party has built this values wall between itself and a lot of voters out there, and the Republicans took advantage of it. The rude awakening here is that I always thought there were more of us out there. And this time there were more of them.”
Hence, the Democrats dominate some highly concentrated, but mature or declining, urban centers, and a primary Democratic strategy for dominance, control of the Old Media, has lost much of its effectiveness.
The Republicans own the fast growth areas
Republican dominance of the country’s highest growth areas is nothing short of astounding. Ron Brownstein’s analysis for the LA Times discussed this, with frightening implications for the Democratic Party:
In this month’s election, President Bush carried 97 of the nation’s 100 fastest-growing counties, most of them “exurban” communities that are rapidly transforming farmland into subdivisions and shopping malls on the periphery of major metropolitan areas. Together, these fast-growing communities provided Bush a punishing 1.72 million vote advantage over Democrat John F. Kerry, according to a Times analysis of election results. That was almost half the president’s total margin of victory.
“These exurban counties are the new Republican areas, and they will become increasingly important to Republican candidates,” said Terry Nelson, the political director for Bush’s reelection campaign. “This is where a lot of our vote is.”
These growing areas, filled largely with younger families fleeing urban centers in search of affordable homes, are providing the GOP a foothold in blue Democratic-leaning states and solidifying the party’s control over red Republican-leaning states. They also represent a compounding asset whose value for the Republican Party has increased with each election: Bush’s edge in these 100 counties was almost four times greater than the advantage they provided Bob Dole, the Republican presidential nominee eight years ago.
These high growth Republican areas have been part of an electorate reshaped by the red shift of the last decade. Michael Barone:
The Bush organization literally reshaped the electorate. The 2000 exit poll showed an electorate that was 39 percent Democratic and 35 percent Republican. The 2004 exit poll, which was tilted toward Democrats, found a dead heat: 37 percent to 37 percent. That means that Republican turnout was up 19 percent and Democratic turnout up only 7 percent. This is the most Republican electorate America has had since random-sample polling was invented.
Notice that the trends are all in one direction. Virtually all the fastest growth counties in the country are in the GOP camp. National Republican turnout has reached parity with Democrats, after lagging behind since the Great Depression. As we noted two years ago, a survey of office holders showed 439 had switched from Democrat to Republican while in office, while only three went the other way. That trend continues today.
The other Democratic party structural problem: dominance by left wing kooks
Where would you go to get the votes if you were running the Democratic Party? The first thing you’d do is recognize that you are bumping up against some structural limits. In Cook and Cuyahoga counties, the dead people are already voting twice — it will be hard to get any more juice out of these mature or declining areas. The Democrats raised $925 million for Kerry versus the Republicans’ $822 million for Bush, so spending more money is not the answer. Hence, a good place to begin your quest for victory is not to keep losing Democrats who start voting Republican. The Kerry campaign actually did a pretty good job of this.
This space has argued previously that the Kerry campaign was very effective in keeping together the pro-war and anti-war factions of the party, and that’s how Kerry did so well; a straightforward Howard Dean/George McGovern type race would have made 2004 look a lot more like 1972. However, keeping the two wings together was a unique personal achievement by John Kerry, in his roles as war hero/war protester; it is an unsustainable situation for the Democratic party as an institution. Thus in the aftermath of the election, there have been calls by responsible liberals to dump the Michael Moore/MoveOn wing of the party, for example by Peter Beinart of TNR.
Beinart’s idea of kicking the anti-war crowd out of the party’s power structure won’t work, however, since the MoveOn people aren’t going away; indeed, they want to run the party. George Will:
Beinart is bravely trying to do for liberalism what another magazine editor — National Review’s William Buckley — did for conservatism by excommunicating the Birchers from the conservative movement. But Buckley’s task was easier than Beinart’s will be because the Birchers were never remotely as central to the Republican base as the Moore/MoveOn faction is to the Democratic base.
Coaxing the Democrat Bush voters back into the fold is not something the MoveOn crowd shows interest in. The 3 – 4 million Democrats who voted for Bush have been insulted just as much as the Republican Bush supporters in the aftermath of the election by the left wing of the Democratic party; these turncoat Democrats have become “predatory and resentful, amoral, avaricious, and arrogant,” just like the President they voted for, or maybe they’re just plain stupid — in the minds of leftist Democrat elites. Among the GOP’s biggest voter recruiting and retention tools is the condescending attitude of the Left towards everyone who is not them.
Conclusion
The 3 – 4 million Gore voters who voted for Bush are not coming back to a MoveOn-dominated Democratic Party. Roger Simon is right. It is a very big deal when a Democrat pulls the lever for a Republican. Those Democrat voters explicitly rejected the left side of their party; unfortunately for them, the party is not coming back their way any time soon. Furthermore, the Democratic party’s concentration in mature or declining urban centers, where they have already milked every possible vote, suggests that getting an additional 3 – 4 million votes from these traditional Democratic strongholds is an impossible task. An ideological makeover is called for, but also does not appear feasible at present.
Absent making some real and necessary changes, the Democratic party’s default position is this: continue to complain about everything that Bush does, from social security reform to the pre-emptive hit on Clarence Thomas, and hope that the GOP screws up.
Perhaps George Bush will really screw up his second term and give the Democrats the break they need.